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Abstract 
While the importance of the telecom revolution in India has been recognised, little 
attention has been paid to the diverse international influences at the firm level. This paper 
addresses this gap by developing a firm-level framework, drawing on the resource-based view, 
institution-based view and the knowledge-based view of the firm, and by drawing on data 
related to the various foreign firms’ entry strategies during the pre-liberalization period (1980-
1991) and the liberalization period (1991-). The paper demonstrates that the two periods 
required foreign firms to have different capabilities to enter the Indian telecom industry. The 
paper also sheds light on the international knowledge transfer process in Indian 
telecommunications industry with specific focus on the differences between different foreign 
country firms. 
 





The Indian telecommunications revolution has been a significant success story of India’s 
liberalisation in the 1990s and its rise as one of the fastest growing economies in the world 
(Panagariya 2008). Telephone density, or teledensity, the number of telephones per 100 people, 
provides an aggregate measure of the state of telecommunications in a country. The increase 
in teledensity in India demonstrates India’s telecom revolution. Teledensity in 1980-81 was 0.3 
and increased marginally to 0.7 in 1990-1991. In comparison, the following decade saw a 
marked improvement. Teledensity increased to 1.3 in 1995, and with the entry of private mobile 
telecom companies in the latter half of 1990s, was 4.3 in 2000-01. The following decade saw 
a remarkable rise to 52.74 in 2010 (Panagariya 2008, p. 372). By mid-2017, the teledensity was 
93.98 (TRAI 2017).1 Bearing in mind India’s large population (over a billion people) and vast 
geography (over 3 million square kilometres) spread across urban and rural areas, a national 
teledensity of 93.98 demonstrates the extent to which India is now connected through telecom.2  
In explaining the transformational story of Indian telecom, much scholarly attention has 
focused on the role of the state, its economic policies and the deregulation of the telecom sector 
(Jain 2006; McDowell 1997; Mody 1995; Petrazzini 1996; Sridhar 2011). While this has 
undoubtedly played a major role, an important part of the story is the contribution of other 
actors. In particular, we know little about the role of foreign companies in the transformation. 
Given the broader changes in India’s economic liberalisation (Corbridge and Harriss 2013; 
                                                 
1 Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). 
2 Given India’s large population spread across urban and rural areas, it is instructive to look at 
the urban/rural difference in teledensity. By mid-2017, urban teledensity was 172.98 and rural 




Panagariya 2008), the role of foreign companies is distinctively different in the time period 
before liberalisation and after. Post-independence and pre-liberalisation (1947-1991), for the 
most part India relied upon foreign technology to develop its telecom infrastructure. This 
changed in the liberalisation period (1991-), starting a multitude of foreign firm influences on 
the industry. 
The central thrust of this paper is to adopt a firm-level perspective on the Indian telecom 
story. By firm-level, I mean that the focus is on the firm as a bundle of resources and 
capabilities. Furthermore, I draw on the capabilities literature that highlights the strategic needs 
of firms in forming alliances and entering new markets. I also draw on the literature on political 
capabilities of firms to influence the institutional and regulatory environment. By adopting a 
firm-level perspective, I demonstrate that the Indian telecom story is a story of international 
technology and knowledge transfer, international joint ventures, financial capabilities and 
political capabilities of firms. Pre-liberalisation, the relationships between the Indian 
government and other international governments and institutions played an important role in 
transferring telecom technology. In this context, the foreign firms relied on their respective 
governments to lobby and negotiate access to the Indian telecom industry. This changed post-
liberalisation. It is the Indian private companies in joint ventures with foreign companies that 
delivered the infrastructure and connectivity across the vast country. Indian telecommunication 
changed from being based on outdated and inefficient technology with long waiting lists for 
telephones pre-1985, to state-of-the-art technology and one of the lowest prices for consumers 
by 2010. Foreign firms, with their Indian partners, played an important part in enabling this 
transformation by providing access to technology, capital and business practices. 
Unlike Japan’s or China’s telecom transformations, both of which were driven by 
limited foreign participation, India’s route to a modern telecom industry is the result of global 
participation. In Japan, the government played an important role in nurturing Nippon Telegraph 
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and Telephone Company (NTT). Started in 1952, NTT benefitted from the Japanese 
government’s drive towards technological self-sufficiency. By initially importing foreign 
technology and expertise, and investing in national R&D, Japan steadily moved towards 
creating its own telecom infrastructure (Anchordoguy 2001). Similarly, in China, the 
government focused on developing competition between Chinese state-owned enterprises and 
breaking up the monopoly of China Telecom (Liu and Jayakar 2012; Loo 2004). In contrast, 
India’s telecom industry witnessed global participation during its deregulation. 
The 1990s saw the deregulation of the Indian telecommunication sector, which opened 
the industry to several Indian and foreign private sector companies. There have been several 
studies into telecom deregulation in India. For example, two key institutional actors, T.H. 
Chowdary, who drafted the National Telecom Policy 1994 (NTP-94) and was CEO of one of 
the privatised telecom companies, and M.B. Athreya, who headed an influential committee that 
reported on restricting the telecom industry, have written several articles on the shift in telecom 
policy (Athreya 1996; Chowdary 1998a; 1998b; 2004). McDowell’s (1997) book provides a 
detailed analysis of the liberalisation period. His account of the changes in government policies 
in telecom, and in particular the public narratives surrounding telecom deregulation provide a 
comprehensive chronology of the events. Panagariya (2008) provides a comprehensive account 
of India’s liberalisation, including the telecom sector. Several studies have also focused on the 
telecom policies in 1994 and 1999, which aimed to establish the regulatory framework for 
businesses and the incumbent state monopoly (Dokeniya 1999; Dossani 2002; Mukherji 2009; 
Singh 2000). 
I draw on these studies that focus on the political and institutional arrangements. 
However, my focus in this paper is on the foreign firms entering India, rather than on the 
challenges of economic reforms. Whereas previous studies have examined the reasons for the 
nature and pace of telecom liberalisation, they have not focused on the perspective of foreign 
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firms looking to enter a deregulated market. Three important exceptions are Subramanian 
(2010), Desai (2006) and Levi (2007). Subramanian’s book on the history of Indian Telephone 
Industries (ITI) provided useful data on the pre-liberalisation period. While the focus of the 
book is on the challenges facing ITI, the public sector monopoly for manufacturing telecom 
equipment, it provided insights into the role of foreign companies in transferring technology. 
Desai’s book provides a comprehensive account of the different Indian and foreign firms 
operating in India. And Levi’s book provides interesting insights into entry strategies of 
Swisscom, Alcatel, Avaya and First Pacific. Her study demonstrates the need for greater focus 
on individual firms. These books have provided useful data for charting the trajectories of 
foreign firms in India. I draw on two other sources to identify foreign firm involvement. The 
legal battle between the government and various companies over the issue of mobile licences 
in 1992, and the subsequent court case judgements, provided information of joint-venture 
partnerships between Indian firms and foreign firms. I also drew on accounts in the Indian 
newspaper, The Times of India, about the entry of foreign firms and their partnerships. The 
paper has also benefitted from personal conversations with key actors in the industry during 
the liberalisation of the industry.3 
Theoretical Background 
The firm-level perspective developed in this paper draws on the resource-based view (RBV), 
institution-based view (IBV), and knowledge-based view (KBV) in strategy and international 
business. By bringing these literatures together, I develop a firm-level framework to analyse 
the evolution of the Indian telecommunications industry and to identify the key capabilities 
                                                 
3 Whilst not systematic data collection, I have benefitted from conversation with Ashok Juneja, 
ex-CEO of Bharti Broadband and part of the Usha Martin Telecom bidding team. 
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that led to foreign firm success. I begin by outlining the theoretical background of these 
literatures and position its potential contribution relative to the telecom industry research. 
As a discipline, strategy focuses on the question of why some firms outperform others. 
The central premise of RBV is that firms differ in their resources and capabilities and these 
differences are difficult to imitate, copy or replicate for other firms. This explains why some 
firms have a competitive advantage and achieve superior performance. In other words, 
valuable, rare, inimitable and organised heterogeneity in resources and capabilities is the 
cornerstones of RBV (Barney 1996; Peteraf 1993; Wernerfelt 1984). An organisational 
capability is defined as a firm’s capacity to perform an activity reliably over time (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993; Collis 1994; Dosi et al. 2000; Ethiraj et al. 2005). The label, organisational 
capabilities, can span a wide range of activities that a firm can perform, such as marketing 
capabilities, operational capabilities, R&D capabilities and so on. For the purposes of this 
paper, the focus is on financial, technological and joint venture capabilities. By financial 
capabilities, I mean the capacity of firm to raise capital to fund the telecom installation and 
expansion. By technological capabilities, I mean the capacity to deliver telecommunication 
services, which includes telecom equipment manufacture, network infrastructure and client 
management. And by joint venture capabilities, I mean the capacity to find and partner with 
other firms. This includes the capability to work with partners on market entry, establishing 
terms for technology transfer and financing, and once operational, developing a cooperative 
relationship to establish the business (Barkema et al. 1997; Gulati et al. 2012; Ireland et al. 
2002; Schreiner et al. 2009). 
In recent years several strategy and international business scholars have focused on the 
institutional conditions informing strategy (Ahuja and Yayavaram 2011; Meyer et al. 2009; 
Peng et al. 2009). Under the umbrella of IBV, scholars have theoretically argued and 
empirically demonstrated that ‘institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its 
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quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy, and to create competitive advantage’ 
(Silverman and Ingram 2000, p. 20). This has led to identifying a different category of 
organisation capabilities, one that focuses on a firm’s ability to influence government policies 
that can lead to competitive advantage. Sometimes labelled non-market strategies, this 
capability underpins a firm’s capacity to engage with rule-makers (Doh et al. 2012; Hillman 
and Hitt 1999; Oliver and Holzinger 2008; Peng 2003). This includes the capacity to influence 
the formal rules, but more importantly, it also includes the capacity to understand and play by 
the ‘informal rules of the game’ (Baron and Diermeier 2007; Bonardi et al. 2006; Frynas et al. 
2006; Henisz and Delios 2004; Henisz and Zelner 2005; Holburn and Bergh 2008; North 1990). 
A final capability that informs my firm-level perspective is the capacity of firms to 
transfer its technology and know-how to other firms. While there is an overlap with the 
literature on technological capabilities, the inter-organisational knowledge transfer capability 
is distinct and is based on KBV of the firm that posits that knowledge is the key productive 
resource that differentiates firms (Grant 1996; Grant and Baden-Fuller 1995; Spender 1996). 
Based on KBV, the literature on inter-organisational knowledge transfer recognises the 
importance three key success factors – 1) the nature of knowledge being transferred; 2) the 
capacities of donor and recipient firms to teach and learn, respectively; and 3) the inter-
organisational dynamics. Technology transfer involves tacit and explicit knowledge that a 
donor firm has. It is not just a case of selling or licensing the technology (explicit knowledge), 
but the significance of practices and processes that accompany it (tacit knowledge). While 
some of the practices and processes can be codified and made explicit in training manuals and 
standard operating processes, a donor firm needs to have the capability to transfer the 
knowledge by providing training and embedding the technology in a host firm. Equally 
important is the recipient firm capacity and willingness to learn the new technology. The 
recipient firm must see the new technology as significant and be motivated to develop its 
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internal technological capabilities. Here, the inter-organisational dynamics plays an important 
part in establishing trust and communication between donor and recipient firms. Past 
experiences and culture matter in establishing successful technology transfer capabilities 
(Dhanaraj et al. 2004; Dyer and Singh 1998; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Lane and 
Lubatkin 1998; Lucas 2010; Mowery et al. 1996). 
===Insert Figure 1 about here=== 
These five capabilities – financial, technological, joint venture, political and inter-
organisational knowledge transfer – form the basis of a firm-level framework and play an 
important role in explaining the success of telecom firms in India. Figure 1 illustrates how these 
capabilities combine to explain the relationship between donor firms, recipient firms and the 
government. On the left-hand side, the broad oval-shape indicates the institutional context in 
the recipient country within which all actors operate. The recipient government represented by 
the small oval-shape (which is the Indian government in the context of this paper) sets the 
institutional environment and the policy for telecom firms. The rectangular box represents the 
firms operating with the country. For this paper, these are the Indian telecom companies. The 
arrow between the recipient firms and the government indicate the political capabilities of firms 
to shape and influence government policies. The right-hand side of Figure 1 represents the 
donor firms and their institutional context. The arrows flowing from the donor firms depict the 
key capabilities needed for success, which is the focus of this paper. 
Empirical Background 
The telecommunications industry has played an important role in globalisation in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Foreign direct investment (FDI) by telecom companies in the 1990s contributed 
significantly to global corporate activities. For example, the US and European telecom 
companies invested in 60 countries between 1986 and 1991 (Serrano et al. 1991; Thomsen 
1997). In explaining the changes in telecommunications, the dominant focus has been on broad 
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macro issues such as deregulation, globalisation and privatisation of national monopolies. 
However, a few studies have pointed to the importance of firm-level actions and strategy. 
Sarkar et al. (1999) identify key strategic drivers at the firm level. They argue that deregulation 
of the home markets and the loss of monopoly status prompted firms to explore foreign markets 
that were also deregulating. This enabled firms to transfer their existing technology and know-
how to new markets. To benefit from first-mover advantage, firms attempted to establish 
presence in international markets. A large multinational telecom company also benefited 
strategically by having economies of scale and influence in terms of global technology 
standards and developing new technology. Sarkar et al. also highlight that this 
internationalisation of telecom firms features several joint ventures. As firms addressed the 
multiple challenges of gaining market entry, investing in new technology and developing costly 
infrastructure and operations in different countries, they formed various alliances (Jamison 
1998). Clifton et al. (2011) build on Sarkar et al.’s firm-level focus to demonstrate that firms 
from Europe that faced the same regulatory changes followed different internationalisation 
strategies. This highlights that although deregulation and liberalisation was important, 
European firms responded differently to these changes. Moreover, they argue that ‘significant 
investment abroad was undertaken both by firms that had experienced substantial inward 
liberalisation pressures, as well as those who were based in countries where liberalisation 
lagged behind’. A more recent study by Nevalainen (2017) also demonstrates the role of key 
strategic actors within the Finnish Post and Telecommunications Department (PTL), the 
Finnish national carrier. Facing deregulation across Europe, the firm entered ‘the nearby areas 
of the Baltic Countries and north-west Russia in the early 1990s, and only a little later to more 
distant markets like Hungary and Turkey, in which a small but relatively skilled operator could 
seize the opportunity’ (Nevalainen 2017, p. 375). Focusing on the Indian market, Nayak and 
Maclean (2013) also point to firm-level activities. Although they focus on the entrepreneurial 
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field and the role of key actors, they demonstrate the significance of firms such as Bharti Airtel 
in changing the telecommunications industry in India. 
Whereas previous firm-level studies have focused on reasons for companies 
internationalising from their home countries, the focus of this paper is on the differences at the 
firm level between various foreign companies. Unlike previous studies that have highlighted 
firm-level differences in their timing and scope of international activity, the focus here is on 
one international market - India. The changing nature of the Indian telecom industry provides 
interesting insights into how different foreign firms approached their entry into the industry. 
I divide the paper chronologically: 1) pre-liberalisation (1947-1991); and 2) 
liberalisation (1991-2005). Within each time period, I focus on three main issues – the 
government policy related to telecom, which sets the backdrop for the different actors, Indian 
companies involved and their responses, and foreign firms involved and their engagement. I 
use the theoretical framework (Figure 1) to analyse firms and demonstrate the significance of 
the five capabilities. In the final section I discuss the variation in the way different foreign 
companies engaged with the Indian context and the implications of knowledge transfer, country 
entry and country exit. 
Pre-liberalisation (1947-1991) 
India became independent from British rule in 1947. In 1948, the Indian government published 
its first Industrial Policy Resolution (IRP) in which it divided industry into four main categories 
- Sole Ownership of the Central Government, Reserved for the Public Sector, Regulated by 
States, Private sector. These represented the order of importance of the different sectors in 
terms of government/private ownership. The first category included key security and defence 
industries such as atomic energy, railways and military equipment. The telecommunications 
industry was listed in the second category, where the government excluded all private sector 
involvement. Along with coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding and 
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minerals, participation in telecommunications was the sole reserve of the public sector. The 
telecommunications company at the time of independence, Indian Radio and Cable 
Communications Limited (IRCC), was nationalised to create the Department of Post and 
Telegraphy (P&T). This period saw the founding of Indian Telephone Industry (ITI) in 1948 
in Bangalore (now Bengaluru), creating a national monopoly in manufacturing telecom 
equipment. At its inception, ITI, the telecom equipment manufacturer, had some foreign 
company involvement. The British Automatic Telephone and Electric Company (ATE) held a 
minority stake in ITI from its inception until 1977 (Subramanian 2010, p. 45). 
Recognizing the lack of technical know-how to build a telecommunications network, 
P&T sent a technical officer to Europe to identify technology partners (Minutes of the 
Nineteenth Estimates Committee 1957; Subramanian 2010, p. 70). The officer received four 
offers, but the names and nationality of two of these companies remain unknown. The 
government considered two offers - one from a Swiss company (name unknown) and the other 
from ATE. The government also received an offer from International Telephone and 
Telegraphy (ITT). The decision to award the contract was based on 1) technological 
capabilities; and 2) price. On both issues, ATE was seen as a better choice, providing 
favourable terms for the technology licensing and the cheapest bid. The existence of British 
telecom technology prior to independence also worked in ATE’s favour. Prior to independence, 
ATE had worked with the Indian government to install India’s first automatic exchange in 
1914. The chief engineer at ATE, Mr A. F. Bennett, had developed the capabilities to negotiate 
and implement the Strowger technology in the UK, Canada, Poland and Lithuania. Drawing on 
the old British Empire network, ATE also expanded to South Africa and India (Emerson 1989). 
ATE and the Indian government agreed a fifteen-year collaboration to transfer the Strowger 
technology to India. In line with international knowledge transfer theory, ATE sent its staff to 
design, install and train personnel at ITI. Twenty three employees of ATE were deputed to ITI, 
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occupying key posts such as works manager, chief inspector, personnel and recruitment, and 
training. ATE developed ‘methodical procedures to regulate all aspects of the factory’s 
activities. The transfer of know-how was thus confined not solely to technical expertise, but 
also extended to practical expertise pertaining to the overall organisation of work’ 
(Subramanian 2010, p. 73). 
In 1964, the P&T engaged in another foreign technology transfer, this time for the 
production of crossbar switches, with Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company (BTM), which 
was part of ITT. Although Ericsson and Nippon EC bid for the technology tender, P&T chose 
BTM because of its low bid and two main capabilities. First, BTM’s parent company agreed to 
provide loans and bought an equity stake in ITI to enable ITI to purchase machinery and finance 
factory expansion. This cash injection was an important consideration for selecting BTM. 
Second, BTM was perceived (wrongly, as it turned out) to have the technological capabilities. 
The committee that recommended BTM stated that BTM had ‘vast experience in the 
manufacture of varied types of telecommunication equipment’ (COPU 1975-76 1975, p. 6; 
cited in Subramanian 2010, p. 89).4 
In principle, the technology transfer model with BTM was the same as with ATE. BTM 
was expected to provide the know-how and practical expertise. However, the realities turned 
out to be very different; the ‘crossbar agreement … represented a textbook case of all that went 
wrong in the diffusion of know-how from a developed to a developing country’ (Subramanian 
2010, p. 86). BTM faced challenges in coordinating its own operations in Europe and with its 
parent company. The technology was ill-suited to the Indian conditions, and required 
adaptation. Managerial practices also suffered because the Belgian managers were not fluent 
in English (Subramanian 2009, p. 207). In other words, BTM struggled to meet its obligation 
of providing the crossbar technology, illustrating poor knowledge transfer capabilities. 
                                                 
4 Committee of Public Undertakings (COPU) 
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India’s reliance on foreign company technology continued in the 1980s. As ITI moved 
from the crossbar switching technology to electronic switching system (ESS), the foreign 
technology provider changed. The main foreign company active in the telecom sector in this 
period was the French government-owned CIT-Alcatel, which provided the technology and the 
capital to enable India to upgrade its telecom infrastructure. The mode of technology transfer 
was the same wherein the foreign company would provide the technical know-how and 
training. Although CIT-Alcatel had not participated in the initial tender process, the contract 
was awarded to them after discussions at the highest level between the two countries. India 
also agreed to buy fighter jets and enriched uranium from France at the same time (Ramesh 
1982). Technologically, as with the BTM crossbar technology, arguably India did not buy the 
best ESS technology available at that time. The Ericsson AXE switch was more popular in 
developing countries in the 1980s (Bhushan 1987; Mani 1989). However, it is the political 
capabilities of CIT-Alcatel and the Indo-French relationship that proved to be the key capability 
(French pressure pays off 1982). In contrast to the previous two technology transfer deals (with 
ATE and BTM), the political capability worked indirectly, mediated by the French government. 
Although a state monopoly, telecommunications did not become a strategic priority for 
the Indian government until the 1980s. Despite the tendencies of state monopolies to resist 
change, public discourse on the state of telecommunications was shifting towards 
liberalisation. As Das (2002, p. 208; also cited in Panagariya 2008, pp. 371-371) noted: 
The telephones that existed were not dependable – it was rare to get a number on the first 
attempt. The employees of the telephone department were arrogant and corrupt. If the lines 
were down, it could take months to fix unless one bribed the linesman. When an MP 
complained in Parliament of these breakdowns, C.M. Stephens, Mrs. Gandhi’s 
communications minister, replied that telephones were a luxury, not right, and that anyone 
who was dissatisfied could return the telephone, because there was an eight-year waiting 
list for this “broken-down product.” 
Along with the general public dissatisfaction with the telephone system, the 
government was also cognisant of the large import bill from the P&T. Struggling to expand its 
network through equipment supplied by ITI, particularly into rural India, and the lack of 
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telecom equipment manufacturing capabilities in India, the government had few options but to 
look at foreign companies for the technology (Taskar 1981). Projects by the P&T to develop 
switching technology through its Telecom Research Centre were unsuccessful. 
In 1981, the government appointed a Committee on Telecommunications, known 
popularly as the Sarin Committee, to advise on P&T. While the main focus on the committee 
was on internal issues within the P&T, it was widely seen as an attempt to change the existing 
status quo within the government ministries (P&T circles worried over Sarin committee 
appointment 1981). The committee recommended that the P&T be split to separate postal 
services from telecom services. 1981 also saw the entry of Sam Pitroda, an Indian-born US 
businessman. His access to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and subsequently to the next 
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, led to a shift in government attitude towards technology, from 
being a luxury to an important role in development (Nayak and Maclean 2013, pp. 11-13). 
Bypassing the monopoly held by the Department of Telecommunication (DoT), the Indira 
Gandhi, and subsequently, Rajiv Gandhi, championed the Department of Electronics (DoE) to 
promote a wide range of electronics products and services. Pitroda set up the Centre for 
Development of Telematics (C-DOT) in 1984 to develop electronic switches for the Indian 
condition. C-DOT was quick to involve Indian private sector companies, beginning the partial 
entry of private Indian firms into the equipment industry (C-DOT vendors talk on digital 
systems 1985). 
This period also saw the attempt to privatise the DoT. In 1986, two corporate entities 
were created, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL), to operate telephone services in 
Mumbai and New Delhi, and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL), for overseas telephony 
(Bombay-Delhi phone corporation 1986). The carving out of two lucrative sectors opened up 
the potential for foreign firm entry. AT&T/Philips, Alcatel/Thompson and NEC made offers 
to develop the city networks (Three consortia offer $4B Each 1985). However, the government 
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chose to create MTNL and VSNL as corporate entities, albeit under the control of the DoT. 
The aims of the corporate entities were to operate separately from the ministry and to introduce 
market-oriented and commercial management policies, systems and practices to enable fast 
growth. It was also seen as a potential model for privatising, which could be replicated across 
India (Athreya 1996, p. 13). However, the attempt to privatise led to strong opposition and 
several strikes. 
With the convergence of telecom technology with electronics, the DoE was in a position 
to challenge the P&Ts stronghold on manufacture of telephone handsets and other consumer 
facing devices. In 1984, the government marked a shift away from the IPR of 1948, which had 
excluded private sector involvement in telecommunications, by allowing a range of new 
entrants (Industrial policy change 1984). The DoE set up several State-owned Electronic 
Development Corporations (SEDCs) to manufacture telephone handsets, fax machines, 
answering machines and other telecom related equipment. Usha Martin Limited joined with 
Bihar SEDC to manufacture cables in 1986, collaborating with AEG Kabel from Germany. 
Himachal Futuristic Communications Limited (HCFL) partnered with the Himachal Pradesh 
SEDC in 1987 to manufacture cables. They brought in Seiscor Technologies Inc., USA and 
Philips Kommunikation Industries AG, Germany. Bharti Telecom Limited also started their 
forays into telecom during this period. They partnered with Siemens AG, Germany, to 
manufacture push-button handsets in 1985. They also sourced technology for answering 
machines from Takachiho Corporation, Japan, and cordless telephones from Lucky Goldstar 
(LG), Korea. 
The shift in Industrial Policy in 1984 marks an important, although unanticipated, 
change in the telecom industry from the point of view of firms. Although telephony and postal 
services were separated by splitting P&T, the government still maintained the monopoly over 
the telephone service by creating the DoT and restricting telecom equipment manufacturing to 
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ITI. However, the move by the DoE to set up SEDCs inadvertently allowed private firms join 
the industry. Since consumer facing devices, such as handsets, telex machines and answering 
machines, were seen as luxury goods, the government opened the door to multiple firms. The 
SEDCs developed joint ventures with private Indian firms that brought in finance, which in 
turn brought in foreign firms to provide technology. Crucially, this marked the beginnings of 
Indian firm-foreign firm capability development in telecom. 
Liberalisation (1991-2005) 
The 1990s was a highly dynamic period in Indian politics and this had a clear impact on the 
ability of the government to formulate a coherent telecoms policy. In the 1980s the Congress 
government was in power, led by Indira Gandhi (1980-1984) until her assassination, and by 
her son, Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989). However, the 1990s saw seven prime ministers as the 
balance of power shifted between various political parties. This is important because the 
telecommunications industry was a key ingredient in political success and patronage nationally. 
Changes to the telecommunication industry would impact a large number of employees at the 
DoT and ITI.5 It was also important internationally, because it enabled powerful ministers and 
Indian companies to seek patronage from Indian and foreign firms looking to enter the 
deregulated industry. Furthermore, as an important source of foreign exchange investment, the 
telecom ministry was a sought-after position in the various coalition governments in the 1990s. 
6  
                                                 
5 There were a number of strikes at P&T and ITI during this period. 
6 Deregulation of the telecom industry is mired in controversy. Two telecom ministers, Sukh 
Ram (1993-1996), and A Raja (2007-2010) have been prosecuted of corruption. Because the 
process of granting telecom licences is set by the telecom minister, and firms are looking for 
information about the policy, it opened up the potential for corruption and bribery. 
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The creation of MTNL as a separate corporate entity created significant challenges for 
the DoT and the government. In 1990, MTNL announced bonuses to its staff. This led to 
protests from the other employees of the DoT. In response to the employee bonus issue, the 
government set up a Telecom Restructuring Committee (popularly known as the Athreya 
Committee) to propose a new structure. While the main recommendations for restructuring 
faced significant political opposition, the government agreed to allow private companies to 
enter, what were seen as, ‘value-added services’. These were electronic mail, voice mail, data 
services, audio text services, video text services, video conferencing, radio paging and 
crucially, cellular mobile telephone. Mobile telephony escaped the political turf-wars because 
it was seen as a luxury, and that mobile phone calls would be primarily made to fixed-line 
telephones, thus increasing the traffic to the DoTs monopoly. This resulted in a tendering 
process in 1992 to grant eight licences, two for each city, for New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and 
Chennai, to set up mobile phone operations. Although licences were granted, this led to a long-
drawn legal battle between the rejected bidders and the government. As India did not have a 
mobile phone industry, the government stipulated that Indian private companies wishing to bid 
for licences should have a foreign collaborator with experience and funding to set up the 
infrastructure. The court cases between India Telecomp Ltd v Union of India in 1993 and Tata 
Cellular v Union of India in 1994 provides initial evidence of various foreign entrants and their 
Indian partners (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The court cases led to some clarity with respect to foreign company participation, 
particularly in terms of providing technical and financial expertise.7 For example, Bharti 
                                                 
7 The DoT invited bids for the first licences for the metro cities on 31/03/1992. The DoT 
announced the winners on 12/10/1992. Four companies filed writ petitions at the Delhi High 
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Cellular’s foreign partners were SFR, Emtel and Talkland. The court case argued over the 
telecom expertise necessary to quality for the licences, focusing on the scale of operations of 
the foreign collaborator. The case also illustrated the importance of foreign collaborators 
providing all the foreign exchange needed to finance the setup costs. It also clarified the number 
of joint ventures each foreign collaborator could be part of. For example, Telecom Malaysia 
had partnered with two Indian companies. The case judgement revealed that this was seen 
unfavourably by the DoT panel in their shortlisting process. 
The legal battles delayed the entry of mobile phone companies until 1995. By this time 
a National Telecom Policy in 1994 (NTP-94) was created and another round of bidding was 
initiated, this time for value added services such as mobile phone and for wired telephone 
services. The 1995 action brought in new foreign partners, but also led to the exit of some. The 
companies and their Indian/foreign partners awarded licences to operate in New Delhi, 
Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata in 1995 were: 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Subsequently, as the licences for other regions in India were auctioned, there were more 
new foreign company entrants in the bidding process. However, during this period, it is difficult 
                                                 
Court, challenging the decision. On 26/02/1993, the Delhi High Court upheld the challenge 
from two companies, forcing the DoT to change the companies it granted licences. The 
resulting changes meant that Tata Cellular lost its licence and, hence, challenged this in the 
courts. On 26/07/1994, the Supreme Court of India delivered its verdict on the bidding process 
for the metro licences. The evidence presented in the two cases provided useful data for 
understand the joint venture partnerships in the bidding process. Since the courts examined and 
clarified the criteria used for selection, it provided information on the technical and financial 
capabilities of the foreign partners. 
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to ascertain if bidding can be seen as entry because the rules for bidding and controversy over 
the role of government may have persuaded some to exit. For example, several foreign 
companies, such as Shinawatra, Thailand and Bezeq, Israel partnered with HCFL to bid for 
eight licences. Furthermore, the relationship between Vanguard, US and BK Modi, who 
partnered to bid for six licences, strained following the issue of licences and led to a fallout 
over investments (Tewari 1996). However, it was clear that there was significant interest in 
bidding for the wider licences from across the globe, in terms of bringing in telecom expertise 
and equity, as well as finance for infrastructure development. Table 3 provides a list of the 
foreign companies, divided into telecom and finance capabilities. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Between 1999 and 2002, several of the licences were traded, which led to exits and 
consolidation. For firms, the licenses had value irrespective of whether they started operations. 
This period saw several firms merge and the number of players in the industry reduced. While 
the challenges of regulatory uncertainty contributed to the consolidations, firms also saw this 
as an opportunity to value their equity stake in trading their licenses. The relationship between 
foreign entrants and the Indian partners were strained in some joint ventures, due to differences 
in strategy (Anand 1996). The DoT also aimed to strengthen the bargaining power of Indian 
companies by allowing them to change their foreign collaborators (Pandey 1995). The 
consolidation also made sense in terms of business strategy, benefitting from economies of 
scale.  
In terms of actual operations, the first few companies to launch services were Bharti 
Cellular, Modi Telstra, Usha Martin, Essar, RPG, Skycell, Hutchinson Max and BPL Mobile, 
who were granted licences for the major cities (see Table 2). In other words, the foreign 
collaborators, Hutchinson, France Telecom, SFR, Cellular Communications International, 
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Malaysia Telecom, Telstra Australia, Bell South, and Vodafone provided the foreign exchange 
capital and their technical expertise in launching services. 
In 1999, India revised its national telecom policy and produced the NTP-99, which 
provided greater clarity and certainty for firms. It also created a regulatory body, Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and subsequently further clarified its role in dispute 
resolution.  
Differences in Foreign Firms’ Entry Strategies 
From the viewpoint of foreign firms, the evolution of Indian telecommunication industry from 
a national monopoly to a liberalised economy with several private sector companies has posed 
different strategic questions. By adopting a firm-level perspective, I have focused on the role 
of firms, and in particular foreign firms. We can see that the pre-liberalisation period was one 
where the political actors were foregrounded and were the key players in the co-evolution of 
the telecom industry. The Indian government was the sole actor that foreign firms engaged with 
to get access to the Indian market. Financial capabilities and technological capabilities played 
an important part, but success rested in demonstrating political capabilities and knowledge 
transfer capabilities. For example, the French firm, CIT-Alcatel was the one that was able to 
engage with technology transfer to India through the Indian public sector company, ITI. This 
technology transfer, brokered at the highest political level, enabled CIT-Alcatel to enter the 
Indian market. The links between CIT-Alcatel and the French government, and diplomatic 
relations between Indian and France played an important role in the process of knowledge 
transfer. 
Post-liberalisation, the dynamics within the industry changed dramatically for foreign 
firms. While the nexus between business and government was still important in terms of 
understanding the various changes in telecom policy, the main conduit for foreign firms’ 
activities were the Indian private sector companies. The choices made by foreign firms from 
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different countries, and the route they took to enter the Indian telecom sector were different. In 
terms of choices for market entry, government regulation stipulated that foreign firms could 
not engage in the sector without local partners. Hence, the only choice open to foreign firms 
was the joint venture route. There were two key issues that were pertinent to forming a joint 
venture: expertise in telecommunications and/or financial clout. Some of the foreign firms that 
entered the market did so purely in terms of providing finance to their Indian joint venture 
partner. Others entered with their telecom expertise (see Table 3). Furthermore, the mode of 
engagement also differed. Some companies chose to adopt a ‘hands off’ approach, allowing 
the local partner to manage the operations and the complicated relationship with government 
officials. Managing the relationship with the DoT and with the regulator, was a specialised 
capability that foreign firms did not have. Hence, they relied on the local partner to bring this 
capability. This is where a company like Bharti Airtel was very successful. In contrast, Swiss-
PPT chose a much more ‘hands on’ approach, appointing their own senior team and seeking to 
increase their equity stake. However, this also led to their quick exit from the industry because 
they lacked the key capability, of managing the relationship with the government, telecom 
ministry and the regulator, to operate in the industry. 
To appreciate the differences between foreign firms that entered India in the post-
liberalisation period, I divide the foreign entrant firms into three categories: European firms 
(including the UK), US firms and others. The European telecom firms’ entry into the Indian 
market needs to be seen in the context of liberalisation and privatisation in their home countries 
(Clifton et al. 2011; Davids 2005; Hulsink 1999; Kornelakis 2015; McDowell and Lee 2003). 
During the 1990s the monopoly of national telecom operators was dismantled and the sector 
faced new entrants into their domestic markets. Table 4 shows the year in which the country 
liberalised and privatised its telecom operator. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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One of the early entrants was the French national company, France Telecom. In 1994 
it entered a joint venture with BPL by taking a 37% stake in BPL Mobile Telecom. The firm 
won the lucrative Mumbai licence in 1995 and was the leading company, competing against 
Hutchinson Max. In 2000, France Telecom expanded through a series of acquisitions. One of 
these was the brand ‘Orange’, which belonged to Hutchinson. Despite France Telecom owning 
the brand worldwide, Hutchinson had retained the rights to the brand in India, launching it in 
2000. This meant that BPL would be competing with the Orange brand in the Mumbai market. 
France Telecom tried to increase its stake in BPL. However, it finally exited India in 2004 by 
selling its stake, unable to consolidate its position in India. 
SFR was another early French entrant in 1994. However, they exited early, in 1997, 
selling their stake to BT. SFR’s exit seems to be a result of BT’s alliance with Compagnie 
General Des Eaux (CGE), the owners of SFR (British Telecom picks up 22.5% in Bharti 
Cellular 1997). 
Another European early entrant into the Indian market was the Italian national telecom 
company, Telecom Italia. Using their Dutch subsidiary STET NV, they partnered with Bharti 
Airtel by taking a 33% stake in Bharti Telnet and a 20% stake in Bharti Tele-Ventures in 
1995/96. As part of their global strategy and in preparation for privatisation, STET expanded 
its international operations rapidly, including into India (Hill 1995). 
Telia, Sweden entered the industry through a joint venture with Parasrampuria Group 
to form J.T. Mobile, which won the licences to operate in three regions (Karnataka, Andhra 
Pradesh and Punjab) in 1995. However, significant changes in their home market led to their 
exit in 2002. During that time, Telia was privatised and merged with the Norwegian company, 
Sonera, to form TeliaSonera in 2002. 
Another early European company to enter the Indian market was Switzerland’s national 
carrier Swiss PTT, renamed Swisscom after privatisation in 1997. In preparation for 
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competition in its domestic market and the EU in general, Swisscom followed an international 
strategy and entered several countries in the 1990s, including India. Swisscom partnered with 
one of the large Indian business houses, Essar, to create Sterling Cellular in 1996. Swisscom 
invested US$ 215m and provided financial guarantees for its 32.5% stake in Sterling 
(Swisscom 1997, p. 36). In contrast to the other European companies, Swisscom was keen to 
have operational control in India. It appointed Swisscom personnel to key positions, including 
Chief Executive Officer (Jan Erik Boers), Chief Operating Officer (Andreas Schelling), Chief 
Financial Officer (Neill Quinn), and Head Marketing (Peter Stock) and attempted to increase 
its stake in Sterling (Mohan 1998). However, by 1999, Swisscom had decided to sell its stake 
in India because of its attempts to focus on ‘the Heart of Europe’ strategy and the continuing 
delays and uncertainty in the Indian government’s telecom policy. 
BT, the UK’s former national carrier was a late entrant into the cellular industry. While 
it had presence in other industries, such as V-SAT and electronic mail (Malik 1986), and had 
bid for cellular licences in 1992, it had not managed to enter the industry. As stated earlier, 
BT’s entry into India was an unexpected outcome of its alliance with CGE whose subsidiary, 
General Mobile Company (GMC) had a stake in Bharti Cellular (BT acquires stake in Bharti 
Cellular 1997). However, it too exited India in 2001 to focus on its UK strategy and to reduce 
its debt. During this period, BT had borrowed heavily to bid for the UK 3G licence. 
Arguably, the US telecom industry was better placed to enter the Indian market because 
of it had liberalised and privatised its operations earlier. In 1978, the US allowed competition 
in the sector and the national carrier, AT&T, was broken up into several independent 
companies in 1987. Two US communications companies, Hughes Electronic Corporation 
(HEC) and Alltel Corporation, joined the Indian business house, Ispat, to launch Hughes Ispat 
Limited (HIL). With HIL as the 51% equity partner, HEC held 34% stake and Alltel held 15%. 
The main strength of this joint venture was the technical expertise brought by HEC and Alltel. 
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HEC had strong capabilities in telecommunication networks, and Alltel had strong operational 
support capabilities such as systems and software for billing and customer support. The 
management of HIL was also strongly determined by HEC, who appointed a former HEC 
executive, Rajendra Patel, as CEO who brought his vast experience in telecommunications in 
the US and his Indian-origin credentials to the job. 
The US major, AT&T formed two partnerships in entering India. Firstly, in 1994, it 
joined A.V. Birla to for Birla AT&T Communications, which won licences for Gujarat and 
Maharashtra. Subsequently, in 2000, it joined BPL to form BPL Cellular, which won licences 
for Maharashtra, Goa, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The partnership with BPL became problematic 
because BPL/France Telecom had a separate joint venture for Mumbai (see above). However, 
as with the European markets, AT&T was facing challenges in the US. In 2004, it merged with 
Cingular Wireless, leading to consolidation in the US market. This refocusing strategy resulted 
in AT&T’s exit from India. 
Along with the US/European entrants, there were several Asian firms that participated 
in joint ventures. The Japanese national carrier’s entry choice into India was through the 
wireline service. In contrast to the interest in cellular operations, NTT chose to partner with RP 
Goenka in bidding for the wireline license in Tamil Nadu in 1995. However, disagreements led 
to this license being forfeited in 1998. 
By far the most successful entry was by Hutchinson, the Hong Kong-based telecom 
company. Hutchinson Max, the joint venture with Max India, bid for and won the license for 
Mumbai. It consolidated its position in India through a series of acquisitions, buying Sterling 
Cellular, Usha Martin Telecom and Aircel. Globally, Hutchinson has demonstrated the 
capability to create large telecom businesses and exit. Its strategy in Europe showcased its 
capability to grow the Orange brand, and subsequently sell off the business to Mannesmann in 
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2001. Similarly, after building the brand in India, Hutchinson sold the business to Vodafone in 
2007. 
The entry and exit of Australia’s Telstra’s followed a similar pattern to the European 
companies. They initially entered the industry with Modi, and received the license for Kolkata. 
As with the European companies, Telstra faced competition in its home market because of 
deregulation. Similarly, Telstra focused on the Asia-Pacific region and its home market, rather 
than invest in expanding its operations in India. 
Conclusions 
The Indian telecommunications industry has transformed remarkably, from the low teledensity, 
poor connectivity and long waiting lists for telephones, to a thriving and competitive market 
with advanced technology. While India’s liberalisation and the regulatory changes in telecom 
have played an important part in facilitating this transformation, the Indian and foreign firms 
have played an important part in achieving this at the ground level. The aim of this article was 
to provide a firm-level perspective on the changes. Whereas previous research has focused on 
the regulatory and economic issues, I focused on the role of foreign firms. Focusing on the 
firm-level, we can see that firm capabilities are crucial in delivering the changes. Prior to 
liberalisation, the main capabilities that foreign firms needed were financial resources, 
technological expertise and, crucially, political capabilities to enable them to work with the 
Indian government. They also needed knowledge transfer capabilities, once they gained entry. 
Liberalisation led to the need for foreign firms to develop new capabilities. In particular, they 
needed to form joint ventures with Indian private companies, and provide technical knowledge 
and capital investment. 
For foreign firms, India was one of the international markets that opened up as they 
faced competitive pressures in their home markets. Success/failure in the Indian market 
depended, not so much on the technical and financial capabilities, but on their ability to manage 
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the joint venture and to deal with the market uncertainties. Equally important, were the changes 
in the foreign firms’ home markets and their capabilities to strengthen their positions in their 
domestic industry. The paper shows that firms were able to exercise strategic choice, leading 
to different approaches to their India entry/exit strategy. The European firms faced significant 
challenges in their home market, which impacted their India strategy. Several international 
mergers and alliances also led to different strategic choices made by US firms. 
For foreign firms, two key capabilities stand out from their Indian experience. Firstly, 
foreign firms need political capabilities to understand and influence the institutional setting and 
understand the ‘rules of the game’. Pre-liberalisation this was orchestrated through their 
connections with the Indian government, mediated by the home country government. In 
contrast, post-liberalisation, firms needed the capability to form and maintain joint ventures 
with Indian firms. The joint venture firms’ political capabilities to navigate the changing 
regulatory environment played an important part in foreign firms’ success. By demonstrating 
the interplay between financial, technological, joint venture, political and inter-organisational 
knowledge transfer capabilities that shaped the participation of foreign firms in the Indian 
telecommunications success story, I have highlighted the significance of a firm-level 
perspective. In so doing, I hope to stimulate further empirical research that investigates firm-
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Table 1: Foreign Companies and Indian Partners in 1992 
Foreign Partner Indian Partner Bidding Company 
SFR France, Emtel Mauritius 
and Talkland UK 
Bharti Tele-Ventures Bharti Cellular 
Bell South, USA Crompton Greaves Skycell 
France Telecom, MaCaw 
Cellular, US and LCC Inc. US 
BPL BPL Telecom 
Hutchinson, Hong Kong Max Hutchinson Max 
Telecom Malaysia Usha Martin Usha Martin Telecom 
Telecom Malaysia Dalmiya India Telecomp 
Alta Telecom, Canada   
OIC Australia Modi Indian Telecom Ltd. 
Vodafone RPG Mobile Telecom 
Bell Canada Enterprises Tata Tata Cellular 
Nynex, USA Modi Modi Telecom 
Singapore Telecommunications HCL Mobile Comm 
 Essar Sterling Cellular 
(Source: Tata Cellular v Union of India) 
 
Table 2: Winners of 1995 bids for New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai 
Foreign Partner Indian Partner Company Name 
Hutchinson, Hong Kong Max India Hutchinson Max 
France Telecom BPL BPL Telecom 




Malaysia Telecom Usha Martin Usha Martin Telecom 
Telstra Australia Modi Modi Telstra 
Bell South, USA Crompton Greaves Skycell 
Vodafone RPG Mobile Telecom 
 
Table 3: Major Foreign Equity Investors in Cellular Companies, Circa 1997 
Investor Country Stake (%) Cellular Company Business House 
National Incumbent 
AT&T USA 49 Birla AT&T Birla 
NTT Japan 49 Basic RP Goenka 
Telstra Australia 47.6 Modi Telstra Modi 
MBT Malaysia 40 Usha Martin Telecom Rai 
Bell Canada Canada 39 Tata Teleservices Tata 
PTC Philippines 34 Koshika Rai 
STET Italy 33 Bharti Telenet Bharti 
Swiss PTT Switzerland 30 Aircel Digilink Sterling 
France Telecom France 26 BPL Mobile BPL 
Other Telephone Operators 
First Pacific Hong Kong 49 Escotel Escorts 
Vodafone UK 49 RPG Cellcom RP Goenka 
Hutchinson Hong Kong 49 Hutchinson Max Max 
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Jasmine Thailand 49 J.T. Mobile Parasrampuria 
Media One USA 49 BLP Cellular BLP 
Distacom Hong Kong 39 Spice Modi 
Shinawatra Thailand 33 Facel Maloo-Nahata 
BellSouth USA 24.5 Skycell Thapar 
GMC USA 22.5 Bharti Cellular Bharti 
Century USA USA 19.5 Aircel Sterling 
Financiers 
Al Amin Mauritius 49 Barakhamba Sterling 
AIG USA 49 Tata Cellular Tata 
Cellfone Mauritius 46 RPG Cellular RP Goenka 
Asia Pacific Infra Hong Kong 39 Essar Commvision Essar 
Mobilvest Mauritius 30 Sterling Cellular Sterling 
Reddington Singapore 29 Aircel Sterling 
Emtel Mauritius 17 Bharti Cellular Bharti 
Others     
Hughes Electronics USA 49 Hughes Ispat Ispat 
Millicom Luxembourg 24.5 Skycell Thapar 
(Source: Desai, 2006, p. 99) 
Table 4: Privatisation of the European Telecom Industry and Liberalisation of their Markets 
Domestic market Year of liberalisation National operator Year of privatisation 
United Kingdom 1984 British Telecom 1984 
Italy 1997 Telecom Italia 1997 
Switzerland 1997 Swiss PTT 1997 
France 1998 France Telecom 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
